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Institutional Stability in Management 
Practice and Industrial Relations: The 
Influence of the Anglo-American Council for 
Productivity, 1948-52 
IAN CLARK 
De Monrfort University 
The endurance of inslitutional stability in British industrial relations and 
management practice during the initial post-war years rested on two factors; 
the international viability of the British economy and the respite that victory 
in the Second World War afforded to embedded patterns of regulation in 
both areas. This paper addresses these factors through the vehicle of the 
Anglo-American Council for Productivity (AACP), and, specifically, its 
British section. The AACP was created to examine the issues of 
management practice and productivity in British manufacturing. The AACP 
aimed to transform management practice and raise levels of productivity in 
British manufacturing to those attained by the average American firm.' It 
follows from this that the success or failure of the AACP must be judged on 
the extent of its capability to transform management practice in the UK. 
Although American management practice informed the AACP's 
recommendations, the British section diluted American proposals to afford 
representatives of British employers and management an opportunity to 
secure institutional stability in management practice and industrial relations. 
Before proceeding to the historical narrative, brief comment is made on 
other pertinent analyses of the AACP. This is followed by a specification of 
how this contribution adds value to the existing literature. Lastly, the 
research methods that have been employed are briefly sketched. 
The AACP has received much recent attention. Carew has exanlined the 
council as a propaganda vehicle designed to divide the European labour 
movement and inject a more American-scientific approach into British 
management practice.' Carew suggests that the AACP was not primarily 
designed to transform British management practice, but is, alternatively, 
more appropriately understood within the emergent Cold War.3 Carew 
argues that Marshall Aid in general and the AACP in particular were both 
businessmen's programmes based on American values of free enterprise 
and, contrary to appearances, the interests of workers and organised labour 
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were decidedly secondary. The immediate achievement of Marshal1 Aid 
was to finalise a growing split in the international labour movement and 
reinforce the anti-communist sentiments of US foreign policy. This 
approach follows an agenda that has recently been established by 
international relations scholars such as Hogan and Maier." 
In contrast, Tomlinson and Tiratsoo have examined the AACP within the 
framework of state intervention in the British economy between 1939 and 
1945.5 Here it is concluded that while the British government was concerned 
with improving productivity and management practice it was more 
immediately concerned with and constrained by the UK's precarious 
balance of payments position. Both of these approaches concentrate on the 
failure of American recommendations to transform British management 
practice; however, they have relatively little to say on the specific issue of 
industrial relations. 
In stark contrast to the above, Barnett has argued that the Labour 
government missed a clear opportunity to modernise and transform the 
British e~onomy .~  This was the case because of its political determination to 
build a 'New Jerusalem' in civil society as opposed to modernising the 
British economy. In addition to this general criticism, the government is 
presented as a double failure; its domestic agenda was ill-conceived, but, 
further, the government embraced established patterns of behaviour in 
British management and class culture, including industrial relations. From 
this, Barnett holds that the government accepted the existing political 
framework, including great power status as evidenced by a reserve currency, 
maintenance of the sterling area, and voluntarism in management practice 
and industrial relations. This acceptance led the government to 'squander' 
Marshal1 Aid funds on a domestic housing programme and debt retirement. 
In defence of this argument, Barnett points out that only about nine per cent 
of British GNP was spent on investment goods in 1950, in comparison to 19 
per cent in West Germany.' In similar vein, Broadberry and Crafts have 
argued that the failure of the AACP to transform embedded patterns of 
industrial relations in the immediate post-war years is a central factor in 
explaining the UK's comparatively poor economic performance over the 
whole post-war period to date.s In particular, they suggest that the 
intransigence of trade unions, in the forms of multi-unionism and restrictive 
practices prevented management from taking up many of the suggestions 
made by the AACP. 
In contesting and contextualising the contributions of Barnett and 
Broadberry and Crafts, it is necessary to draw a sharp distinction between 
the AACP in general and its British section. This analysis will illustrate that 
representatives of employers and management within the British section 
played a significant role in sustaining embedded patterns of management 
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practice and associated patterns of industrial relations. The AACP was a 
failure because the American section could not successfully position its 
arguments and findings in the British section. Thus, the notion of 'failure' 
has to be specified in two distinct ways; the failure of the AACP's overall 
prescription for improved management practice and productivity and why 
the British section considered the prescription inappropriate. This 
engagement is of value for two reasons. First, much of the established 
literature on the AACP begs the question of the objective criteria used for 
'failure'. The idea of failure centres on the argument that the reconstruction 
of the British economy envisaged by the AACP did not occur. For longer 
term competitiveness such a failure may be one factor in the diagnosis of 
declining economic performance. However, the key issue is why the AACP 
was a short term failure. American proposals were rejected by the British 
section in large measure because they ignored short term economic 
constraints, for example shortages of capital and materials. Equally, 
American proposals, if implemented, would have reduced industrial output, 
and as a result threatened the international viability of the British economy. 
Rather than an investment-led transformation of plant and equipment, 
international viability was secured through a recovery in output largely 
sustained by the existing capacity of plant and equipment. This approach 
was designed to correspond with the wider aims of the British government 
in the Marshal1 Plan and the recovery in output during the post-war years 
led to significant gains in labour productivity - the primary aim of the 
AACP. The AACP, though not necessarily its British section, was a failure 
because it was unable to find immediate or culturally acceptable ways to 
achieve a modernisation of management and industrial practice. It is 
plausible to argue that during the post-war years the AACP's British section 
sought to formulate short term solutions to the issue of productivity within 
the economic constraints that were imposed and accepted in order to secure 
the viability of the British economy. 
A second contribution that adds value to the existing literature relates to 
the position of the conventional institutional approach to industrial 
relatiomY The approach details central features in the British system of 
industrial relations, in particular, the embedded nature of state abstention, 
autonomous and short-termist approaches in management practice and 
collective bargaining. However, the approach does not engage with the 
AACP as an institution, the British section in particular, (even though) the 
British section played a central role in securing wider institutional stability 
in industrial relations. This omission is of critical significance to the current 
interest in the AACP because it has enabled other literature sets to 
appropriate and generalise the UK's pattern of industrial relations as a 
singular factor of explanation in Britain's deteriorating economic 
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performance over the post-war period. In addressing this omission it is not 
the intention to deny the need for institutional analysis but to strengthen its 
relevance. 
An industrial relations system represents an institutional sub-set of a 
particular industrial society. The institutions and processes of job 
regulation, such as management, trade unions and collective bargaining, are 
not confined to the disciplines of economics and politics."' Rather, the aims 
of management and employees in the employment relationship are more 
appropriately understood within a historically positioned institutional 
analysis. This methodology forms the basis of the conventional approach to 
industrial relations in the UK." The institutional approach visualises 
economic policy and the 'high' politics of the state as external to the 
institutions of industrial relations. However, as this paper demonstrates, 
post-war economic policy and foreign policy played a major role in 
underpinning the institutional preference for autonomous management 
practice and free collective bargaining. 
By applying the institutional methodology to archive material on the 
British section of the AACP it is possible to demonstrate that it was in 
symmetry with the economic and political aims of the government. 
Moreover, this approach documents how the British section reflected the 
embedded patterns of behaviour detailed by institutional analysis. This 
approach will demonstrate that patterns of industrial relations must be seen 
as an 'end game' that cannot be isolated from a wider framework of 
economic and political objectives that confront prescriptive mechanisms 
such as the AACP. The embedded nature of internal institutions in industrial 
relations must be positioned within the external context that underpins their 
stability. Patterns of industrial relations are an 'end game' because their 
institutional workings are affected (in the post-war period, stabilised) by 
broader economic and political considerations that are external to the 
institutions themselves. It follows from this position that industrial relations 
and its institutions cannot be independent causal factors of explanation in 
successful or unsuccessful economic performance. Alternatively, industrial 
relations is likely to be one of several factors of influence, thus, as an 
individual factor its effect can only be marginal. The positions of cause and 
effect and interdependence are ignored by much of the recent revisionist 
literature. 
The argument and narrative of this article are supported by reference to 
primary and documentary sources, contemporary studies and the secondary 
sources of interpretation cited above." 
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I1 
THE VIABILITY OF THE BRITISH ECONOMY 
The British government used the Marshal1 Plan as a financial mechanism to 
secure the sources through which the British state earned its income. There 
were four such sources; first, a manufacturing base that was disparate in 
scope, primarily serving the domestic market and varied export markets, a 
majority in the sterling area; second, freight charges for transport in British 
ships and the insurances taken out in London on the cargoes - these sources 
were diminished by the war effort and the associated loss of commercial 
shipping; third, interest earned on money borrowed in London; and, last, 
investments in foreign countries." 
In 1943, the Board of Trade (BOT) began to examine issues such as 
industrial efficiency in the light of an eventual victory in the war." BOT 
thinking, although it was critical of 'bad management', assumed that the 
UK's manufacturing base would continue to serve a less than standardised 
domestic market and varied export markets, particularly in the sterling area. 
Equally, the BOT assumed that domestic modernisation in industry, 
including industrial relations, would be managed on a plural and tripartite 
basis.I5 The hard currency that was subsequently, if unexpectedly, provided 
by'Marshal1 Aid served as the basis on which this recovery by continuity 
was pursued. This was the view that Foreign Secretary Bevin took to the 
July 1947 Conference for European Economic Cooperation (CEEC). This 
conference was called by Britain and France in response to the offer of 
Marshall Aid. In its original guise, the terms of reference for this conference 
were to organise an integrated pan-European response to the American 
offer. In contrast to this, the conference was skilfully managed by Foreign 
Secretary Bevin to ensure that its institutional legacy, the Organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), oversaw national pathways to 
recovery.I6 In the UK's case, the national pathway was designed to secure 
the UK's residual great power status by maintaining the sterling area and the 
reserve currency status of sterling." 
The British government was prepared to accept a residual great power 
status in return for autonomy in the organisation of the British recovery 
programme and associated use of Marshall Aid funds.'This was manifest 
in four ways. First, in return for the United States reluctantly guaranteeing 
the reserve currency of sterling, that is, supporting the sterling area as a 
multilateral trading area, the UK played a major role in internationalising 
the Cold War throughout western Europe.Ig Second, the UK secured atomic 
and nuclear status in an American-dominated NATO.1° Third, the British 
government undertook to enact a productivity programme centred on 
American best practice in management techniques." Last, significant 
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criticism of the UK's deployment of Marshall Aid funds was accepted, but 
not necessarily acted upon, particularly in relation to the use of 'counterpart 
funds'.22 
In summary, the American objective within the Marshall Plan was a 
long-term restructuring, if not transformation, of European capitalism on an 
integrationist In contrast to this view, ERP states, and the UK in 
particular, viewed the Marshall Plan as a mechanism that would underpin a 
continuity in national policy.?' By necessity, within national aims and 
objectives the outlook was short term. In this respect, the UK's recovery 
programme is best described as a production or output effort that did not 
raise the scale of economic efficiency but which did have a considerable 
impact on labour productivity. The UK's post-war output drive was in 
economic terms marginal, that is, one sustained at a low capital cost with 
comparatively low levels of investment in new plant. Here, the volume of 
output at the existing scale of capital was the main consideration. Hence the 
concentration on labour productivity within existing capacity. Continuity in 
the UK's national pathway (one independent of pan-European regulation) 
g necessitated an immediate output drive to maintain export markets. This in 
turn precluded the apparent need for large scale industrial renewal. 
The scale of British manufacturing capacity was not significantly raised 
by Marshall Aid for three reasons. First, prior to the inception of Marshall 
Aid the economy was experiencing full employment, and hence it was not 
necessary to undertake considerable investment to create employment. 
Second, and related, the vast majority of British Marshall Aid was spent on 
food and raw materials. In the context of a fully employed manufacturing 
economy this was the most sensible course of action. The UK had to export 
manufactures for imports of food and raw materials. The finance of imports 
is the basis of the third factor. The export-led recovery of output was 
threatened by the UK's lack of dollars to pay for the necessary imports. 
Using Marshall Aid to purchase food and raw materials sustained the 
recovery of output by funding the dollar gap to secure imports. 
The following points are offered to substantiate this interim conclusion. 
First, there is general agreement that the economic effects of the Marshall 
Plan on the British economy were marginaL2' The Bank of International 
Settlements calculated that in its first year UK Marshall Aid amounted to 
2.4 per cent of national income, an injection into the British economy worth 
about one year's economic On the basis of UN statistical abstracts, 
Milward suggests that for the year 1949 UK Marshall Aid represented 5.2 
per cent of GNP, or 7.5 per cent taking into account the September 
devaluation of the pound. A figure of 5.2 per cent in Milward's calculations 
was enough to finance two and a half years' national g r o ~ t h . ~ '  The essential 
point, however, is that although the economic impact of Marshal1 Aid was 
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marginal it was critical in maintaining the UK's output and export drives. 
Economic theory is not necessarily useless in this regard; alternatively, its 
utility is not positive, as economists would like, but demonstrative of how 
economics is subsumed into the wider aims and objectives of state policy. 
In financial terms, maintaining the UK's overseas defence commitments 
and the sterling area were significant cost constraints on the domestic 
economy. An economic evaluation, confined merely to costs and therefore 
excluding potential revenue streams, would have suggested an early 
devaluation of the pound and curtailment of the sterling area. Such a course 
of action could not prevail, for, as Milward points out, the UK's whole 
approach to foreign policy and the Marshall Plan was not governed by 
economics but by perceived political and strategic necessity. In order to 
sustain the UK's national pathway it was necessary to maintain the level of 
exports; this in turn legitimised the marginal output drive, which over the 
short term overcame the need for large scale industrial renewal. Post-war 
recovery was sustained in a volume-based effort delivered, in the main, by 
existing plant. 
The political economy of the UK's post-war recovery, as mediated by 
the state's wider policy on the Marshal1 Plan, was not governed by cost 
minimisation alone, but also by the generation of revenues that would 
secure the UK's domestic market and its disparate export markets, many of 
which were in the sterling area. Closure of the sterling area would have 
reduced the costs of recovery but would have simultaneously reduced the 
UK's potential revenue sources because of the extent to which British 
export markets were geared to the sterling area.'8 This policy was 
complemented by an industrial efficiency programme designed to reduce 
unit labour costs by boosting labour productivity. 
In this context, it appears safe to argue that management was encouraged 
to invest in labour rather than capital equipment. Hence, investment in 
labour was quantitative rather than qualitative. This was the case even 
though the economy was fully employed and in the absence of capital 
reconstruction overtime working became the norm. Calculations indicate 
that the output drive necessitated considerable overtime working from as 
early as 194KZY Overtime working was often necessary because of the 
difficulty in producing long-run batches of goods when British industry was 
geared to small batch production without standardisation of products. 
Equally, the output drive sustained existing plant where improvements in 
labour productivity flowed from the volume intensity of labour rather than 
investment in capital to raise the scale and efficiency of plant and labour. 
Both Middlemas and Milward have described this process as 'institutional 
short termism' peculiar to the British state and British management.gO 
Equally, it has been described as all that could be expected from a 
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productivity programme that sought to 'Americanise' production 
management without significantly reforming the framework of management 
pra~tice.~'  
The UK's successful recovery of output was in large measure marginal, 
that is, at existing scale. It prevailed in spite of, not because of, American 
Marshal1 Planners' wider aspirations within the AACP. It is in these 
contexts that the failure of the AACP's prescription for the transformation 
of management practice and industrial relations must be positioned. 
111 
THE POST-WAR OUTPUT DRIVE: THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE AACP 
To substantiate the theme and conclusion of the previous section, the 
argument is grounded within the institutional framework that confronted the 
AACP, in particular the manner in which the British section embraced the 
output drive to strengthen its own legitimacy in the eyes of employers and 
management. 
The AACP was set up in order that British manufacturers could learn 
lessons from American best practice in terms of production management, 
management accounting and standardisation in production. A transatlantic 
education programme was initiated which involved 66 team visits to the 
United States. The teams were made up of industry groups who studied 
aspects of production management, work organisation and management 
accounting, and specialist groups who examined issues such as factory 
layout, palletisation and materials handling. Each team produced an 
'American' best practice report.32 
The main conclusion of the AACP was that improved labour 
productivity could only be sustained over the long term by higher 
investment in mechanised production." This would lead to more efficient 
production management in materials handling and improved systems of cost 
and management accounting. In combination, such developments would 
yield management a more accurate measure of unit costs and facilitate lower 
costs of production and higher labour productivity over longer production 
runs. It is generally agreed that the focus of AACP findings centred on the 
deficiencies of British management in the highlighted areas.j4 In addition to 
this point, the manner in which Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and co-founder of the AACP, delegated the British section of the 
AACP to the FBI, BEC and TUC has stimulated much comment.35 By 
taking a hands-off approach, the government enabled representatives of 
management and employers to set their agenda in the British section. It is 
generally accepted that this was one of several factors that led to the overall 
failure of the AACP. Whilst this position is undeniable, it is equally 
72 BUSINESS HISTORY 
undeniable that the failure of the prescription behind the AACP, but not 
necessarily its British section, represented a victory for the overall aims and 
objectives of British recovery. 
In 1943, the FBI indicated that the UK's likely post-war position would 
dictate that output and exports must prevail over any significant efforts 
towards industrial modernisation. Equally, it was argued that the UK would 
need some measure of protection from American competition through 
maintenance of the sterling area in Empire and Middle Eastern markets.gb 
By 1948, the British government and industry were not in a position to 
entertain industrial reconstruction on the scale envisaged by Marshal1 
Planners in the productivity programme. The disaster of sterling 
convertibility in the summer of 1947 compounded existing materials and 
capital shortages and drained British dollar reserves. Equally, the lack of 
hard currency precluded large scale imports of capital equipment and 
materials from the United  state^.^' 
These issues are clearly reflected in the papers of the FBI and the British 
section of the AACP. Norman Kipping, the Director General of the FBI and 
a joint secretary of the AACP's British section, made it clear to UK trade 
associations that there would be no American interference with the British 
section. Essentially, Kipping conceived the British section as a national 
initiative that excluded the government and the American Marshal1 Planners 
in the ECA. In essence, the British section was to represent the interests of 
the employers, a series of interests that incorporated the institutional 
representation of organised labour.3a In addition, he made it clear that in 
terms of productivity improvement the main criterion for British industry 
should be the lowest cost over productivity per man/h~ur.'~ The notion of 
lowest cost over productivity per manhour appears on first view not to 
make economic sense unless it is recognised that lowest cost refers to the 
scale of operations. Labour productivity can be improved at a low capital 
cost if the volume of output is the main consideration, even though in 
theoretical terms output is increasing but encountering the law of 
diminishing returns, that is, sustaining a level of allocative inefficiency. For 
the government and the British section this was necessary because, in the 
short term, securing the international viability of the British state precluded 
raising the scale of British capital by significant new investment in plant. In 
contrast to this, efforts centred around increasing output at the existing scale 
of plant by focusing on labour productivity. A move to re-structure, scrap 
and scale up manufacturing industry through high levels of investment in 
new plant would have shut British manufacturers out of export markets, 
weakened the balance of payments and stalled post-war recovery. This 
combination of effects would have returned the British economy to the 
situation that prevailed in the summer of 1947. 
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AACP documents from 1948 support this position. In the view of the 
British section measures to increase productivity per manhour through 
greater capital investment would, in the short to medium term, have 
increased units costs." This was the case because of the loss in output and 
the set-up costs created by the deployment of new production systems. 
Equally, new systems would have also required new (American-style) 
systems of management practice and more institutionalised collective 
bargaining. This latter point was something to be avoided because it would 
have strengthened the position of trade unions in the workplace." As an 
alternative to this, the British section made it clear that for British 
manufacturers output must prevail over productivity with quantity rather 
than the quality or scale of production representing the main imperative. 
Further, this alternative was necessary because the British market 
(domestically and overseas) was not standardised in the manner of the 
American domestic market." It would appear that these arguments were 
also designed to defend the relatively small scale of British manufacturing 
plants that served disparate markets." ACCP files indicate that at the time 
the vast majority of British manufacturing plants employed fewer than 500 
workers, with only 60 employing over 5,000.a The British section also 
documented its doubts about the standardisation of production in industry. 
Although during the war there had been considerable rationalisation of 
output, it was in large measure nullified by the diversity of end user 
requirements in the post-war years; examples are cited from steel 
manufacture, metal window frames, gear cutting equipment and the 
production of cooker hobs." 
The themes of marginal improvement in productivity at existing scale 
are also evident in FBVACCP documents on regional productivity 
conferences and exhibitions. Here, the documents detail why the FBI should 
always retain overall control of the conferences; this was necessary because 
the main constituency was 'top management', who needed practical 
information on applications in the current climate not heavily technical 
 explanation^.'^ This view prevailed because technical detail on new systems 
of work organisation would require the re-negotiation of collective 
bargaining agreements, for example, new equipment and systems of 
production would impact on existing demarcation agreements and involve 
considerable expenditure on training. In the planning stages for conferences 
in Leicester and Nottingham it was suggested that displays on material 
handling, storage and factory layout should focus on existing British best 
practice. In this regard, the objective was too indicate how existing best 
practice had been adapted in the light of American experience not 
transformed by it."' It would appear that practical applications in the context 
of existing best practice reflected the primary consideration of increasing 
output whilst minimising capital expenditure. 
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The draft documents for the AACP's fifth session report in 1952 
consolidates further the cost minimisation approach. Both output and 
productivity were seen to be best improved in the short term by maximum 
utilisation of existing resources; a direct result of this was considerable 
overtime working. The draft also establishes that during the previous four 
years employers had not experienced significant labour inflexibility. 
However, it was added that, over the longer term, improvement in output 
and productivity could only be sustained by significantly higher levels of 
mechanisation in production, more power tools for intermediate stages in 
production and better factory layout and production organisation. Further, 
the draft reiterates that over the past four years an increase in capital 
expenditure by industry would have reduced output and export levels." An 
alternative explanation for employer support of the cost minimisation 
approach has argued that employer associations and trade associations were 
imbued with a cartel mentality based on secure markets and that similarly 
they were obsessed with wage costs.?g These sectional interests were only 
inflamed by placing the FBI and BEC centre-stage in the UK's output-based 
productivity drive; this positioning secured the FBI's long-standing 
preference for recovery without significant reconstruction. This recovery 
was evident in a continuity of management practice, however, the AACP's 
final report portrayed this as a victory of American manageriali~rn.~~ Thus, 
the aims of the British section did correspond with those of the government, 
but, in addition, its aims secured the narrow material interests of employers. 
As Carew argues, the victory of American managerialism was considerable 
in that it incorporated organised labour and the TUC into the productivity 
pr~gramme.~ '  Beyond this, however, the operational mechanics of 
American management could not dislodge the UK's embedded politics of 
productivity which the work of the British section actually sustained. 
Within the AACP, the TUC was, in the main, supportive, the General 
Council was active in promoting the productivity drive and in general saw 
the AACP as a mechanism that would further strengthen the promotion of 
union membership and collective bargainings2 However, the TUC was 
guarded in some of its observations; for example, the TUC General Council 
indicated that in its view there would be no material gain on the United 
States unless there was much greater capital investment in the UK. It was 
added that this situation would prevail even taking into account the good 
increases in output between 1946 and 1949." 
In addition, the General Council made reference to material published in 
The Ernes. This material suggested that in the absence of significant capital 
renewal all that could be hoped for from the productivity initiative was a 
2-3 per cent increase in productivity per a n n ~ m . ~ ~  Equally, the TUC was 
unhappy with the manner in which the British section appeared to divert 
INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY 75 
AACP findings and direct them specifically to top management without full 
reference to report findings. This was particularly the case in terms of 
improved mechanisation and training for shop-floor ~peratives.~%astly, the 
TUC was concerned about the manner in which work study was being 
moulded by the British section, and initiated its own trips to the United 
States to examine the i~sue .~"  
The main theme in TUC concern was the sustainability of the output 
drive in the absence of longer term considerations; in particular, the lack of 
capital renewal and the consequences of this for shop-floor workers. In its 
submissions to the AACP, the TUC argued that the UK could not compete 
with, or be compared with, the United States in any meaningful way." This 
was the case because the American manufacturing sector operated on 
different measures of productivity and productivity irnpro~ement.~' In 
addition, the TUC appeared unconvinced that under the auspices of the 
British section manufacturing industry would be able or inclined to make 
the necessary improvements on a voluntary basi~.~ '  
The programme of British visits to the United States sought to 
demonstrate the benefits and encourage the take-up of two aspects of 
American management practice that provided a structure for high 
productivity. First, a 'scientific approach' to management that presented the 
manager as a technically informed economic and social engineer. Second, 
institutionalised pluralism in industrial relations centred around 
institutionalised collective bargaining in the workplace, constitutional trade 
union recognition and a commitment to job security.@' 
Hoffman, the co-chairman of the AACP and Director of the ECA, 
argued that the visits programme was of technical importance, but, equally, 
that the visits would expose the British, and particularly British labour, to 
the benefits of the 'American way'.h' Hoffman's enthusiasm for the visits 
programme was based on a belief that 'distributional' conflicts between 
management and labour over productivity and wages were primarily caused 
by scarcity.62 Moreover, scarcity could only be reduced by increasing 
productivity and productive efficiency through measures such as 'scientific 
management', business planning and constitutional piuralism in the 
w~rkp lace .~~  
Maier suggests that Hoffman's ambition in prescriptive mechanisms 
such as the AACP was informed by his apolitical views on productivity 
improvement; however, this view became ideologically charged in the post- 
war years as part of the general anti-communist sentiment in US foreign 
policy." The divergence between the American and British sections of the 
AACP partly resulted from Hoffman's contradictory position; on the one 
hand, he advocated apolitical benefits (economic and material) of improved 
productivity for both management and labour, yet he was operating within 
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a series of institutions (AACP and ECA) that were increasingly caught up 
in the wider aims of US foreign policy. Ultimately, the divergence of views 
between the American and British sections disappeared as Hoffman 
accepted the national distinctiveness and embedded pattern of the FBI's 
responses in the AACP. That is, Hoffman accepted that the British section, 
like the British government, wanted something different from the AACP 
than he did; however, his 'acceptance' of the distinctively British approach 
was cushioned by the fact that British management and the TUC came to 
accept the presence, as a model, of American practices, if not their adoption 
in the workplace. 'Scientific' management presented managers as 'social 
engineers' trained in quantitative aspects of production management. A 
'scientific' approach to labour and production management was promoted 
as an impartial and neutral arbiter in the apolitical allocation of labour, not 
as an 'agent of capital' primarily concerned with the control and 
subordination of labour in the labour process.65 
American Marshall Planners in the American section argued that 
quantitative practices had enabled American management to operate in a 
'scientific' and 'Taylorised' manner since the 'New Deal' era. In essence, 
the New Deal, supplemented by the United States re-armament programme, 
saw 'scientific' approaches to production management and constitutional 
pluralism instituted in many large American workplaces." This movement 
also saw management develop control and production techniques beyond 
craft production that was largely regulated by 'simple' managerial controls. 
Mass assembly production was regulated by technical control strategies that 
were plurally regulated by the discipline of the assembly line and collective 
bargaining.(" A large number of AACP reports appear to bear out this 
development and suggest that American management appeared able to 
mechanise, standardise, monitor and re-structure production with little 
opposition from the work f~ rce .~~  
A central theme in the visits programme was the assertion that a 
corporate approach to management practice compelled American firms to 
develop corporate pluralism in order for the productive potential of 
standardised assembly h e s  to be captured. This approach was sustained by 
deploying managers, labour operatives and supervisors who were trained in 
technical and quantitative areas such as management accounting, 
productivity management, materials handling, costing and time and motion 
study. In response, the TUC and individual trade unions made two points 
about the generalisation of American 'best practice'. First, a compulsion to 
institutionalise industrial relations in the workplace demonstrates that a 
corporate approach to management does not automatically yield higher 
productivity. Higher productivity has to be extracted through the labour 
process. Second, contrary to the generalisation of American 'best practice', 
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corporate pluralism was not in evidence throughout the US ec~nomy.~' This 
point was forcefully made by the TUC in its submissions to the British 
section; equally, trade unions argued this point in their evaluation of AACP 
In general, AACP reports documented the absence of management 
competence in the areas highlighted above as endemic in British 
manufacturing, claiming that management practice was unscientific, and 
demonstrated poor production pre-planning and ineffective work study.7' 
Notwithstanding this criticism, the British section successfully legitimised 
these characteristics as contingent elements within the output drive. 
American strategists within the AACP, in particular Hoffman, eventually 
accepted the agenda of the British section. By 1952, it would appear that a 
plural, if adversarial, pattern of industrial relations was necessary to sustain 
'unscientific management' that the British section fought so hard to 
maintain.72 Congressional propaganda on the use of Marshall Aid supports 
the intransigence of the British section and demonstrates that between 1948 
and 195 1 the UK's industrial output increased by 25 per cent and was 45 per 
cent above the 1938 This recovery prevailed despite the failure of 
the British section to accept American labour and production practices, that 
is productivity improved without a transformation of management practice. 
Equally, the recovery of output occurred independently of the British 
section, its main role was to position its recommendations to support the 
imperative of sustaining output. 
One implication of stability in management practice for industrial 
relations was a consolidation of the existing framework for job regulation. 
In rejecting American proposals for management practice, the British 
section did not even consider the proposals for industrial relations. The 
records of the British section indicate that as early as September 1948 
industrial relations was written out of its agenda.14 The British section did, 
however, concede that industrial relations issues would crop up, and when 
this occurred any issues should be dealt with by existing collective 
bargaining ma~hinery.'~ In addition, organised labour was well placed in the 
wartime coalition government and the post-war labour governments. The 
TUC had played an influential role in the development of public policy 
through its commitment to 'full employment'; in the early 1940s an 
'implied social contract' existed with the coalition government, often under 
the stewardship of Ernest Bevin.16 However, after the war there was no 
specific planning for wage reg~lation;~' equally, there was no attempt to 
promote shop floor citizenship on the American 'best practice' model. This 
was even the case in nationalised industry.78 
The FBI and the TUC presented separate and mutually exclusive 
defences of free collective bargaining within the British section. For many 
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employers, this defence was visualised as a mechanism to re-establish 
autocratic power in the workpla~e.'~ In this context, many employers 
defined 'free' collective bargaining as free from institutionalised regulation 
in the workp la~e .~~  A reliance on national agreements was also seen by some 
employers as a mechanism to undermine workplace lay activism. For many 
employers these positions represented one of the major post-war 
miscalculations made by British management. The miscalculation was 
particularly evident in sectors that were heavily reliant on overtime working 
- a central feature of the post-war output drive. This was the case because 
overtime agreements were, despite managerial preference for national 
agreements, negotiated at workplace level." 
Voluntary collective bargaining, multi-unionism and tripartite 
mechanisms for improvement in industrial efficiency were widely accepted 
as essential aspects in the productivity programme and its supportive role in 
the output drive. One further development did emerge, however. The 
stability in, and consolidation of, existing patterns in industrial relations was 
positioned within a fully employed economy. The imperative of output began 
to shift the focus of collective bargaining away from national agreements to 
the workpla~e .~~ As this shift progressed during the late 1950s, shop stewards 
emerged as central actors in localised collective bargaining.83 Various studies 
have indicated that localised bargaining was primitive, that is, lacking in 
formalised procedures;" equally, the studies demonstrate that as a result of 
full employment organised labour began to focus its demands on money 
wages through primitive or informal workplace bargaining. Evidence also 
suggests that employers who were particularly concerned with output, such 
as those in the car industry, accepted potentially disruptive local pay deals 
that supplemented nationally agreed norms as a matter of course. The 
negotiation of this order did not necessarily secure any quantifiable 
improvements in prod~ctivity.~~ It has been argued that employers were not 
excessively concerned about this because they were able pass increased costs 
on to  purchaser^.^^ Ministry of Labour estimates for 1948-58 indicate that 
wage drift (average weekly earnings minus the wage rate component) did not 
increase significantly over thls period, remaining at around 25 shillings 
(£1.25). Over the same period, the percentage increase in output was 2.3 per 
cent per annum, whereas unit labour costs grew at four per cent per annum.!j7 
These data appear to indicate that any allocative inefficiency in the 
manufacturing sector, that is, a reliance on overtime working, did not 
increase during the period. However, as the UK's comparative economic 
performance declined, workplace 'inefficiencies' such as restrictive 
practices, previously accepted as marginal, became more significant as 
comparative scale inefficiencies became evident.88 However, management 
'inefficiencies', as identified by the AACP, continued. 
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It would appear that the movement in industrial relations activity to the 
workplace flowed directly from post-war recovery, within which the 
industrial and manageriaI structure was largely unreconstructed. The system 
of autonomous collective bargaining was stabilised, and indeed it was 
further consolidated at workplace level. 
The economy, industrial relations and the industrial efficiency 
programme, the latter under the direction of the British section of the AACP, 
were all necessarily tuned to the short term. In short, the manufacturing 
sector and the industrial relations framework delivered employee 
participation and involvement but also secured what successive 
governments needed, that is, output. One outcome of strong institutions 
within industrial relations, particularly at the workplace, is clearly evident 
here even if it was unrecognised at the time. The strength, stability and 
viability of the industrial relations system was more enduring than the 
capacity of the British economy within which it was positioned. It was this 
strength that stimulated investigation into the industrial relations system as 
an independent internal factor rather than an internal development sustained 
by external factors such as economic and foreign policy in the immediate 
post-war years, and that in turn sustained 'inefficiencies' in management 
pra~tice.'~ 
IV 
THE POST-WAR OUTPUT DRIVE A N D  REVISIONIST ANALYSIS: THE 
I S S U E  O F  INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
The contemporary period has witnessed a major revisionism in the 
treatment of the initial post-war period and the longer term decline and 
comparative failure of the British economy. Prominent in this revision are 
the approaches taken by Broadberry and Crafts and Barnett.'O 
Broadberry and Crafts suggest that economic policy in the immediate 
post-war period was successful in dealing with the UK's balance of 
payments position, yet they argue that the short termism of this policy 
prevented the introduction of essential reforms in the supply side of the 
economy, particularly in the industrial relations system." To support this 
argument, the authors present an econometric treatment of the UK's 
productivity performance in comparison to the United States. However, t h s  
merely confirms that comparative productivity was weak. This position was 
established by central actors in the British section as early as 1948.92 
However, more centrally for the revisionist position, it was the UK's pattern 
of voluntary collective bargaining and endemic restrictive practices that 
made long term adjustment in the economy 'marginal to enviable'." 
Broadberry and Crafts position their conclusions independently of any 
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consideration of management interests. The revisionism in this conclusion 
is evident in two ways. First, it fails to engage with the positioning of 
industrial relations as an effect of post-war recovery. As an alternative, the 
chosen course in post-war recovery is criticised in terms of its consequences 
without reference to the short term necessity that was defined by the UK's 
wider objectives within the Marshall Plan. Rightly or wrongly, the focus of 
post-war recovery was output without significant reconstruction of industry. 
British manufacturers continued to serve disparate domestic and overseas 
markets established prior to 1938. AACP files indicate that manufacturing 
plants of less than 500 workers accounted for 70 per cent of the labour force 
employed in manufacturing, whereas American manufacturing plants were 
much larger. The comparatively small scale of British manufacturing plants 
suggests that regression analysis (the basis on which Broadberry and Crafts' 
wider assertions about industrial relations is substantiated) designed to 
capture the scale economies of American plants relative to British plants 
merely demonstrates that the size and capacity of British plants limited their 
potential for labour productivity growth in comparison to those in the 
United States." The argument that multi-unionism was the main inhibitor of 
growth in labour productivity is weakened by this evidence; that is, it is 
more likely that its effect was marginal rather than a scale factor. The 
relative disadvantage of British plants was obvious to the FBI and the TUC 
in 1948 and these factors led the British section to dilute or reject American 
proposals in favour of existing patterns of management practice.'' In this 
context, any significant reform of industrial relations to reflect American 
practice was unlikely to prevail. Second, the arguments on multi-unionism 
and associated restrictive practices do not sit well with the documentary 
evidence or contemporary academic analysis. TUC and AACP records 
indicate that considerable effort was made on the issue of restrictive 
practices as part of the productivity programme.96 Responses to the TUC's 
'Productivity: The Next Step' initiative indicate that, although there was 
some employer disquiet on restrictive practices relating to overtime, there 
was not a general concern." Equally, trade unions and the TUC were not 
necessarily insistent on the re-introduction of restrictive practices diluted 
due to wartime  condition^.^^ This pattern is confirmed by a major study of 
restrictive practices conducted in the immediate post-war period. 
Zweig presents a detailed study of job regulation and trade unions in 
collective bargaining through the vehicle of restrictive  practice^.^^ The study 
examined the situation in building and civil engineering, cotton, iron and 
steel, printing and engineering. The findings are very revealing and 
pertinent to the issues under consideration. First, there was no general 
agreement on the management side in and between sectors on what 
constituted a restrictive practice. Second, practices such as demarcation 
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rules within multi-unionism were not viewed as restrictive by employers 
because they followed naturally from apprenticeship regulations. These 
were not viewed as impediments to efficiency, but alternatively were 
accepted as an integral part of management practice in job regulation. Third, 
where restrictive practices were identified, many managers had no view on 
what should be done about them. Some managers indicated that the removal 
or reform of workplace practices would entail a significant upheaval in 
management practice. On the whole, it would appear that many restrictive 
practices were viewed by managers as part of a 'negotiated' order (rather 
than unilateral craft control) that helped to sustain output. This 
contemporary empirical evidence suggests that management was not 
primarily concerned with industrial relations but was more preoccupied 
with maintaining output. This is not necessarily challenged by Broadbeny 
and Crafts, but the presence of restrictive practices and the industrial 
relations framework in general are positioned as a central factor in the UK's 
declining economic performance over the post-war years.'" Equally, 
Broadberry and Crafts assert that restrictive practices were more endemic 
than the evidence suggests. Further, as the British section and the 
manufacturing sector were geared towards delivering output, an aim that 
was successfully prosecuted, the economic effects of any restrictive 
practices could not have been significant. 
In addition to their central argument, Broadbeny and Crafts argue that 
the industrial relations framework inhibited human capital f~rrnation.'~' It is 
more appropriate to suggest that this was an effect of the positioning of 
industrial relations and management practice in the output drive rather than 
a centrally causal factor. It would appear that improvement in training and 
development was not forthcoming because existing production systems did 
not require this. 
The position taken by Barnett is much more controversial and 
superficially convincing, yet unsustainable in the light of the overall 
argument in this piece.'02 Barnett argues that the post-war Labour 
government, followed by its successors, missed a clear opportunity to 
modernise and transform British industry along the lines of the American 
model. The 'New Jerusalem' thesis suggests that the welfare state and a 
public sector complemented by wide scale nationalisation diverted attention 
from concern with the real economy. This is complemented by the 'Victory' 
thesis, which argues that the government wanted the best of both worlds, 
that is, a domestic 'New Jerusalem' positioned within the status of a great 
power.'" In consequence, the government was determined to maintain 
sterling as a reserve currency. Equally, and by association, the government 
felt unable to challenge the organised working class. Hence, industrial 
relations was not reformed because such a move would undermine the role 
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of the working class in creating a New Jerusalem. In combination, these 
domestic and external constraints encouraged the government to squander 
Marshall Aid on food, domestic housing and public debt retirement. Barnett 
argues that the government should have terminated the sterling area and 
injected more Marshal1 Aid into the domestic economy to re-structure the 
manufacturing sector on the American model. 
This policy was evidently politically impossible under the wider British 
aims within the Marshal1 Plan. Moreover, its economic benefits would have 
been more marginal than the chosen course. For example, termination of the 
sterling area might have significantly reduced the UK's overseas debt but at 
the immediate cost of closing many of its export markets and intra-sterling 
area trade. These losses would have been severely detrimental to the 
security of the UK's international economic and political viability. 
Similarly, though the use of counterpart funds for debt retirement did 
preclude their use for industrial renewal, it has been established that such 
funds were not a vital source of investment. The recovery of output 
generated high profit levels, and it has been argued that private sector firms 
did not need outside sources of finance for investment funds. This argument 
is supported by Public Record Office files for 1948, which indicate that of 
£2,000 million in gross investment nearly 50 per cent was secured by 
undistributed profits, use of reserves and bank advances.IM Equally, in the 
absence of structural and scale improvements in British manufacturing it is 
unlikely that industry would have been able to effectively deploy 
counterpart funds. Further, documentary analysis of the AACP's British 
section appears to suggest that employers and managers were not supportive 
of large scale reconstruction. The assertion that this situation prevailed 
because the government felt unable to challenge this preference ignores the 
wider political economy of this situation. The government was not 
motivated to use counterpart funds for debt retirement because it felt unable 
to challenge trade unions in the manufacturing sector. In contrast to this 
view, it would appear that securing the viability of the economy (by debt 
retirement) was directly responsible for securing the viability of the 
manufacturing sector (by sustaining its export markets). 
The main problem with Barnett's approach is the assumption it 
embodies: the generalisation of decline is written from a position of 
revisionism that suggests the government promoted a political process in 
civil society that sacrificed economic performance. In addition, the 
arguments on industrial relations and restrictive practices are generalised 
from shipbuilding, the only sector examined in any detail.'" Equally, in the 
specific case of industrial relations, the issue of cause and effect has been 
reversed; that is, trade unions preventing management from introducing 
AACP recommendations. The evidence appears to point to the conclusion 
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that within the British section of the AACP it was primarily the TUC which 
was pushing for a more engaged consideration of American proposals, 
whereas the evidence suggests that any inhibitive attitudes and behaviour 
displayed by organised labour at the workplace was not seen as a serious 
concern of management. Moreover, the TUC's guarded criticism of the 
British sections' response was subsumed into the FBI's overall approach 
that legitimised the output drive without significant reform of workplace 
management practice or industrial relations. 
v 
CONCLUSION 
Institutional stability in industrial relations and management practice during 
the initial post-war era represented an end-game or institutional effect of the 
wider economic aims and political objectives of the British state in its 
engagement with the Marshall Plan. This wider political economy cannot be 
divorced from the internal institutional mechanisms that operated in the 
British economy. 
The economic and political aims of the British state during the Marshall 
Plan era were primarily directed towards securing the UK's national 
pathway to economic recovery. The structure of the UK's manufacturing 
sector and the markets it served necessitated an immediate recovery of 
industrial output. Equally, securing the international viability of the British 
state rested on sustaining markets that accounted for a large proportion of 
the UK's export trade, and hence termination of the sterling area would have 
been an inappropriate response. So, too, was the wholesale restructuring of 
the UK's manufacturing sector. This was the political economy that faced 
prescriptive mechanisms such as the AACP. 
The argument of this paper centres on a sharp distinction between the 
AACP and its British section. By elaborating and grounding this distinction 
within the available archive material on the British section, it is clear that its 
central institutional actors, the FBI supported by the BEC, were supporters, 
if not advocates, of the overall approach taken by the government. Hence it 
is not suprising that the AACP's general prescription was a failure. In terms 
of industrial relations, its failure was assured not only because a 
reconstruction of British manufacturing was inappropriate, but because the 
American prescription, however forcefully put, could not dislodge 
embedded patterns of management and union behaviour. Equally, 
reconstruction and transformation were incompatible with the wider aims of 
the British state, whereas a continuity within patterns of management 
practice and industrial relations did play an important part in securing the 
recovery of output. 
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The lack of industrial relations reform reflects the wider failure of the 
AACP to reform management practice. Industrial relations was one of the 
AACP's failures, but not its central failure, which was the inability of 
American Marshall Planners to appreciate the UK's economic and political 
aims. Moreover, failure and success must be balanced; the failure of the 
American-inspired reconstruction represented a success for the aims and 
objectives of the British state, in particular maintaining its independence 
from pan-European regulation. It is unlikely that the UK's economic 
performance would have been any better if the AACP had been successful. 
The loss of output and markets would have been difficult to make up, 
especially as the west European market was recovering and becoming 
increasingly competitive. 
The continuity in embedded patterns of management practice and 
industrial relations was an effect of securing a recovery in output and 
sustaining the UK's international economic and political viability. 
Revisionism cannot be corrective in the sense that it can reverse history, 
neither can the rational actor model inherent to economic theory be wholly 
successful in isolating one marginal variable or policy choice and then 
generalising its contribution to wider economic ills. Victory in the Second 
World War was not lost in the immediate post-war years; independence and 
sovereignty, the basis on which the UK entered the war, was secured by 
directing post-war efforts to the international viability of the British state. The 
recovery in output was successfully prosecuted, and the UK's post-war 
economic performance relative to its recent past was good and in line with 
predictions made by central actors in the British section of the AACP. 
However, comparative economic performance was not so successfully 
maintained in the 1960s and 1970s. Clearly, output did not decrease during 
these decades, but comparative levels of labour productivity did decline.'" It 
would appear that many of the revisionist arguments are positioned in this 
context, and it is here that the absence of industrial relations reform is 
highlighted as a central factor. However, an archival and institutionally 
informed analysis demonstrates that trade unions and the TUC were not so 
much intransigent, but were operative in, or constrained by, embedded patterns 
of regulation which neither management or trade unions wanted to change. 
The recovery of output was successfully prosecuted, yet problems 
remained in production management and productivity. Industrial relations 
issues may have headlined these difficulties; however, in the Marshall era 
as today problems in industrial relations are not centrally causal, but effects 
of embedded patterns of behaviour in management practice that are in turn 
distilled through the economic aims and political objectives of the state. 
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